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ESSAY
SPLITTING LOGS:
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION SETTLEMENTS
Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heiset
Most cases settle, in employment discrimination litigation as elsewhere.
Unfortunately, empirical knowledge of settlements remains limited. Data
scarcity fuels untested perceptions and, all too frequently, misperceptions
about how employment disputes are resolved. This Essay exploits a unique
data set of successful settlements in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois from 1999-2004 that includes for each case the plaintiffs
initial monetary demand, the defendant's offer, and the resulting settlement.
We find that in raw constant dollars, final settlements are typically far closer
to defendant offers than plaintiff demands. After converting plaintfif de-
mands, defendant offers, and final settlements into natural logs, however,
the typical settlement splits the difference between plaintiff demand and de-
fendant offer. We also find that settlement amounts rise if a trial date is set
for a case. Finally, results from three-stage least squares models-that plain-
tiff demands influence defendant offers that, in turn, influence final settle-
ment amounts-provide a glimpse into the structure of employment
discrimination settlements.
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INTRODUCTION
As trials "vanish," settlements flourish.' Data from state and fed-
eral courts evidence this trend. The overwhelming majority of civil
filings in state courts increasingly settle prior to trial, and only a small
percentage result in ajury or bench trial verdict.2 The per capita rate
of trials in general jurisdiction courts in twenty-two states fell by 33%
between 1976 and 2002.3 A trend away from court resolutions and
toward settlements also characterizes litigation in federal courts.4 The
proportion of lawsuits commenced in federal courts that trials re-
solved fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.5
Although the move toward resolving civil litigation through settle-
ment rather than trial generally characterizes cases in the employ-
ment discrimination context, complicating wrinkles exist. On the one
hand, the broad point that settlements perform most of the work
resolving lawsuits certainly describes the employment discrimination
setting. Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab, for example, found that
settlements resolved almost 70% of employment discriminations
claims filed in federal court.6 Moreover, similar to most other types of
1 See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (tracking the
decline in civil trials from 1962-2002 and suggesting increased rates of settlement as a
possible cause).
2 In 1992, settlement resolved more than 70% of tort cases in the nation's seventy-
five largest counties, and jury or bench trial verdict resolved less than 3%. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE
COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 3 tbl.2 (1995). Similar findings emerge for
contract cases. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CONTRACT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 tbl.7
(1996) (finding that agreed judgment resolved nearly 50% of certain contract cases in the
nation's seventy-five largest counties and that jury or bench trial verdict resolved, com-
bined, less than 3%); see also BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2005: CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN
STATE COURTS, 2005, at 8-9 (2009) (discussing the decline in civil trials generally); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE
COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIEs, 2001, at 2 (2004) (dif-
ferentiating between types of cases).
3 Galanter, supra note 1, at 523, 527 fig.38.
4 See Kevin M. Clermont & StewartJ. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 439 fig.6, 440, 457-58 app. (2004).
5 Galanter, supra note 1, at 462-63 tbl.1.
6 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 440. Of note, however, is that, as compared to
other plaintiffs, employment discrimination plaintiffs are slightly less likely to resolve litiga-
tion through settlement. See id. at 440-41.
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cases, not only do most employment discrimination cases settle, but
"more and more do so with the passing years."'7 On the other hand,
employment discrimination cases settle less frequently than other case
types.8 To be sure, it is difficult to overstate the point that employ-
ment discrimination cases have joined the general and pronounced
trend away from trials and toward settlement for resolution. That
said, the slope for employment discrimination cases is less steep than
the slope for other case types.
What accounts for civil litigants' growing preference for settle-
ment over trial? Litigants' self-interest-including practical factors
such as increased prospects for reduced disposition time and cost9 as
well as avoiding the unpleasantness typically associated with trials and
trial preparation-certainly contributes. In addition, despite impor-
tant costs, the legal system itself increasingly promotes settlements
through the rise of the alternative dispute resolution movement as
well as provisions in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 199010 and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.11 Indeed, these statutory
developments help explain why virtually every federal district court
now either requires or strongly encourages litigants to participate in a
settlement conference.12 Finally, settlement provides litigants with
the opportunity for increased privacy as confidentiality agreements
binding settling parties are common.13
This shift from trial to settlement as the mechanism of choice for
resolving employment discrimination disputes, combined with the
popularity of confidentiality agreements binding settling parties, im-
poses important costs. 14 While confidentiality agreements generate
benefits (including settlements), they reduce the amount of informa-
7 Id. at 440.
8 See id.
9 See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can
Reduce the Legal System's Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior, 61 SMU L. REv. 1355, 1355 (2008).
10 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2006)).
11 Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 6, 112 Stat. 2993, 2995-96 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 654
(2006)) (amending the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988)).
12 See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111, 126 (2007); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 16
(stating that a court may order parties to appear for pretrial conferences to facilitate settle-
ment); Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, judicial Settlement Databases: Development and
Uses, JUDGEs' J., Winter 2004, at 19, 19 (describing the judicial conference as a "principal
means by which cases are resolved").
13 See MinnaJ. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927,
929 (2006) (describing confidentiality agreements as the "norm" in individual employment
discrimination cases that settle).
14 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YLE L.J. 1073 (1984) (describing
many of the problems associated with settlement, especially coerced consent, bargains
struck by those without authority, subsequent judicial involvement, and favoring efficiency
over justice).
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tion available to subsequent litigants. Ironically, this lack of informa-
tion can impede the settlement process itself 15 Without access to a
repository of settlement agreements, parties seeking to resolve an em-
ployment discrimination dispute-as well as courts seeking to pro-
mote settlements and reduce court congestion-lack critical
information.
Thus, although most litigation ends in settlements, we know frus-
tratingly little about the outcomes or the process of settlements.
Therefore, we know frustratingly little about most litigation. Reduced
information about settlements, especially about settlement terms, also
imposes costs on research literatures. The popularity of confidential-
ity agreements in employment discrimination lawsuit settlements im-
pedes a broader and deeper understanding of settlement behavior in
these cases.16 Although settlements greatly exceed trials as the mecha-
nism for resolving employment discrimination lawsuits, scholars know
far less about settlements than trials. As Professors Laura Nielson and
Robert Nelson note, "we have virtually no information on how
favorable settlements are for plaintiffs," and this absence of critical
information "represents an enormous gap in our knowledge about
discrimination litigation."' 7
The enormous comparative knowledge gap about settlements
poses a critical challenge to future legal scholarship. Although legal
research on the civil justice system is only beginning to assess trial
activity with empirical rigor, it is already clear that future scholarship
on the American civil justice system will inevitably have to include rig-
orous work on settlements and settlement behaviors. As the trial con-
tinues to vanish and settlements grow in absolute and relative import,
related scholarship will need to adjust as well.
In addition to dampening future research efforts, the paucity of
empirical research on employment litigation settlements helps fuel
widely accepted assumptions about employment discrimination litiga-
tion. One such assumption is that critical litigation stages influence
settlements and their terms. Specifically, many observers opine that a
plaintiffs survival of a summary judgment motion and a judge's set-
ting a trial date are among the critical factors that influence settle-
ment activity and behavior.' 8 Similarly, many also hypothesize that
15 See Denlow & Shack, supra note 12, at 21-22 (describing how settlement data pro-
mote settlement).
16 See Kotkin, supra note 13, at 962 (arguing that reduced information skews empirical
studies of employment discrimination litigation).
17 Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663, 693.
18 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemak-
ing Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 144 (1996) (noting the influence of critical trial mo-
ments on settlement activity).
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the specific nature of the legal claim pursued in an employment dis-
crimination lawsuit influences settlement activity.19 Of course, it is dif-
ficult to know whether conventional wisdom finds empirical support
because, as Professor Minna Kotkin aptly observes, "Nobody really
knows what happens to [most] employment discrimination claims in
the federal courts."20
As the recent profound economic turmoil continues to place
enormous stress on labor markets,21 and as the domestic unemploy-
ment rate flirts with double-digits, 22 this moment is especially apt to
try to gain a better sense about what happens to employment discrimi-
nation claims in federal courts. To provide needed information and
better assess judicial settlement conferences' efficacy, a group of mag-
istrate judges in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois created a settlement data set designed to assist other judges
and magistrates overseeing employment discrimination settlement
conferences.23 While carefully safeguarding party confidentiality, the
data set contains information on the type of case, the nature of claim,
the specific alleged adverse employment action (e.g., failure to pro-
mote or termination), itemized damages, demands and offers, the liti-
gation stage (e.g., whether a plaintiff survived a motion for summary
judgment), and final settlement terms and amounts. These data are
important, and we are unaware of any other data sets that are similar
in size, scope, or focus. Most distinctive is that for each case, our data
set includes the plaintiffs initial monetary demand, the defendant's
initial monetary offer, and the resulting settlement amount.
This Essay focuses on the interactions involving plaintiff de-
mands, defendant offers, and final settlement amounts. We also assess
how factors such as litigation stages and alleged injuries influence ne-
gotiations in employment discrimination litigation. By exploring
these factors with the benefit of actual settlement data, our findings
are far more germane to how the majority of employment cases con-
clude. We find that while a few specific litigation stages emerge as
influential, plaintiff demands and defendant offers consistently exert
important influence over final settlements. In terms of real, constant
19 See Gary Phelan, Resolving ADA Cases Through Mediation, TRILu, Dec. 1998, at 56, 57
(arguing that settlement is more likely in Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims
because, among other reasons, they are less "hostile" than other types of employment
claims).
20 Kotkin, supra note 12, at 112.
21 See Melissa Menkel Shorey & Peter D. Guattery, Changing Personnel Issues in an Eco-
nomic Downturn, MD. B.J., July/Aug. 2009, at 4, 5 (noting the implications for labor markets
generated by economic turmoil).
22 See Peter S. Goodman, 85,000 More jobs Cut in December, Fogging Outlook, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2010, at Al (noting that the nation's unemployment rate-10%-would likely
worsen in coming months).
23 See Denlow & Shack, supra note 12, at 19-21.
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dollars, we also find that final settlements fall far closer to defendant
offers than plaintiff demands.
Final settlement amounts that are closer to the defendant's offer
than to the plaintiffs demand imply greater bargaining power for de-
fendants. To preview another key finding, settlements also convey a
specific pattern in which the parties split the difference of the logs of
their respective positions-or what we term "splitting the logs." The
logarithm is a measure of the order of magnitude, the Richter scale
for earthquakes being a prominent example. If the parties differ by a
couple of orders of magnitude, they will split that difference and the
settlement will be an order of magnitude below the plaintiffs demand
and an order of magnitude above the defendant's offer.
Our Essay also makes a methodological contribution by compar-
ing results from both ordinary least squares (OLS) and three-stage
least squares regression models. The standard regression models
identify, among other factors, plaintiff demands and defendant offers
as systematically influencing final settlement amounts. Although re-
sults from the three-stage least squares models are similar, they pro-
vide helpful texture and nuance. Specifically, findings from our
three-stage model illustrate that plaintiff demands influence defen-
dant offers, which in turn influence final settlements. Thus, while re-
sults from our three-stage least squares model generally reinforce
results from our simple regression modes, the three-stage least squares
model results provide greater insight into the structure of settlement
negotiations and how this structure informs final settlement amounts.
Part I briefly surveys the relevant theoretical and empirical litera-
tures on settlement, with a particular emphasis on the employment
discrimination context. Part II describes our data. Part III presents
descriptive results, concentrating on the spreads among initial plain-
tiff demands, defendant offers, and final settlement amounts. Part IV
presents regression results that provide a more textured picture of the
interactions between key independent variables such as plaintiff de-
mands and defendant offers. We conclude with a brief discussion
about our findings' implications for future research.
I
LiTERATURE REVIEW
Although our analyses focus on factors that influence final settle-
ment amounts in employment discrimination cases, we draw on the
broader theoretical and empirical research literatures that address
factors that influence litigants' decisions to settle (rather than on the
more narrow topic of final settlement amounts). Consequently, we
briefly describe below these distinct-though related-research litera-
936 [Vol. 96:931
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tures, with an emphasis on leading empirical research, and we situate
our study within these literatures.
Comparatively more scholarship assesses litigants' decisions to
settle than final settlement amounts. Scholars point to an array of
factors that influence litigants' settlement decisions. Law and eco-
nomic theory provides a rich and helpful framework. For example,
George Priest and Benjamin Klein assert that litigation culminating in
trials is more likely (and settlement correspondingly is less likely) to
occur in "close" cases.2 4 Others have found such litigation more likely
where the litigants' perspectives of their respective legal positions di-
verge.25 In slight contrast, Robert Cooter and his colleagues Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser feel that litigants' settlement deci-
sions are better understood as a function of bargaining between (and
among) litigating parties.26 To be sure, Priest, Klein, Cooter,
Mnookin, and Kornhauser share common conceptual ground insofar
as litigants' assessments of their legal exposure inform their bargain-
ing positions.
More recently, scholars have looked to behavioral economics for
insights into settlement activity, including framing, anchoring, and
ambiguity aversion theories. After comparing final settlement offers
with actual jury awards where parties rejected final settlement offers,
Jeffrey Rachlinski concludes that framing theory offers much to ex-
plain settlement outcomes. 27 Anchoring theory, a variant of framing
theory, suggests that people estimate with a reference to an initial
"anchor" position, which evolves into a final settlement amount. Re-
search suggests that different anchors generate different expectations
and create different estimates and that these varying estimates tend to
be biased toward the original anchor.28 In the settlement context, dis-
pute resolution scholars argue that opening offers may "anchor" an
opponent's expectations and counteroffers and, paradoxically, im-
pede a rational settlement.29 The latter theory, ambiguity aversion,
exploits litigants' aversion to agreeing to settle when perceptions of
24 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-17 (1984).
25 See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 11 (1995).
26 See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STD. 225, 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
27 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 113, 118, 120, 142 (1996).
28 See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2007) (surveying the anchoring theory literature). For a di-
rected application of the anchoring theory to settlements, see Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 107, 129-42 (1994).
29 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 28, at 139.
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the probability of a successful outcome (at trial) are far from clear.30
To the extent that the disposal of an important motion (or motions)
during the pretrial stage reduces the uncertainty surrounding a trial's
outcome, ambiguity aversion theory might account for an increase in
settlement activity after a court decides a critical motion.
In addition to general law and economic and behavioral eco-
nomic theories, scholars also note the influence of more practical fac-
tors on settlement outcomes. After studying a sample of civil litigation
in state courts, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud emphasize the impor-
tance of the nature of the litigants and their relations to one another,
insurance (including any policy caps), and the distribution of settle-
ment authority on settlement behavior.31 Finally, pure litigation strat-
egy may also influence settlement activity.3 2 For example, by refusing
an otherwise reasonable settlement offer, a party can impose addi-
tional litigation costs on an opponent by either delaying the final dis-
position of a case or, in the posttrial context, encumbering a trial
court award33 or both.
Although civil settlements in general and employment discrimi-
nation settlements in particular benefit from a maturing theoretical
literature, empirical research testing the efficacy of the various theo-
retical accounts is far less developed. Contributing mightily to the un-
derdeveloped empirical literature is a paucity of helpful data.
Moreover, the little empirical literature on employment discrimina-
tion litigation that does exist draws principally on published summary
judgments or trial decisions. 34 Of course, factors that influence which
decisions get published contribute additional complicating wrinkles.35
Even more important is that motion outcomes and trial decisions,
while certainly important, resolve only a comparatively small percent-
age of employment discrimination claims.36 Thus, studies of pub-
30 For an introduction to ambiguity aversion and related discussion, see generally
Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. EcON.
585 (1995).
31 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study ofSettlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mica. L. REv. 319, 322 (1991). A study of medical
malpractice closed claims in Texas notes the influence of malpractice insurance policy
limits on differences between what juries award and what prevailing plaintiffs receive. See
David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4J. EMPHUCAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 4 (2007).
32 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DuKE
L.J. 1405, 1468-71 (2000) (noting various strategic aspects of the settlement process).
33 See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62, 85 (1985) (noting the various reasons motivating a party's decision to file an
appeal).
34 See Kotkin, supra note 12, at 118-25 (summarizing the leading empirical studies).
35 See generally Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6J. EMPHUCAL. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2009) (finding that ideology
influences judicial opinion publication decisions in federal appellate courts).
36 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 457 app.
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lished employment discrimination trial decisions necessarily miss the
resolution of most employment discrimination cases and, in so doing,
introduce the specter of selection bias.
Empirical studies of the comparatively small pool of employment
discrimination cases that proceed to trial emphasize the difficulties
that plaintiffs face in prevailing. Notably, Clermont and Schwab find
that, as compared with defendants, plaintiffs in employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits lose more pretrial motions, trials, and appeals.37 Be-
cause the larger pool of employment disputes that settle likely
systematically differs from the smaller pool of employment disputes
resolved at trial, whether findings from studies of tried employment
cases shed much helpful light on settled employment cases remains
unclear. Wary of drawing broader inferences from data located at the
tip of the "iceberg,"3 8 scholars recently began calling for greater atten-
tion to settlement activity as well as for the development of public set-
tlement data.39
Empirical studies on employment discrimination litigation are
few in number; empirical studies of employment discrimination settle-
ments are rare events. The only major study of employment discrimi-
nation settlements focuses on filling in important descriptive aspects
of settlements. 40 Kotkin's recent study of employment discrimination
settlements is helpful in part because it also uses the Chicago Judicial
Settlement Project data set.4 1 Kotkin's discussion emphasizes two im-
portant themes. First, the median amount for settling plaintiffs ex-
ceeds $50,000.42 Second, settling plaintiffs' recoveries essentially track
lost wage calculations. 43 Kotkin interprets her findings to imply that
plaintiffs' discrimination claims against employers are more meritori-
ous than otherwise suggested by analyses of published trial court
opinions.44
Our study builds on the existing empirical literature in two criti-
cal ways. Unlike most other studies, ours relies on settled rather than
37 Id. at 429; see also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557-61 (2001) (noting plaintiffs' difficulties pretrial and at trial).
38 Peter Siegelman &JohnJ. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAw & Soc'v REv. 1133,
1135-37 (1990) (noting that most studies rely on published court opinions while most
disputes are resolved without a written judicial opinion).
39 See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimen-
sions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 521, 534-35 (2006) (arguing
for making settlement documents and terms public); Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We
Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Tial, I J.
EMPiHCAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 966-71 (2004) (same).
40 See Kotkin, supra note 12, at 129.
41 See id. at 127-29.
42 Id. at 157.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 160.
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tried cases. Moreover, while Kotkin's study of settled employment
claims is limited to principally descriptive analyses with an emphasis
on lost wage claims, 45 our inquiry centers on structural factors that
explain final settlement amounts. Finally, our methodological contri-
bution flows from including both standard regression and three-stage
least squares models that, we believe, more accurately capture the na-
ture of the settlement negotiations between plaintiffs and defendants.
II
DATA AND ANALYTIC APPROACH
A. Data
Our study uses data from the Chicago Judicial Settlement Project
(Chicago Project), which grew out of judges' desires to increase the
efficacy of settlement conferences and frustration with and reaction to
the growing trend toward settlements bound by confidentiality agree-
ments. 46 After every successful settlement conference in the Northern
District of Illinois, the presiding magistrate judge prepares and sub-
mits a confidential settlement summary report.47 Each settlement re-
port takes approximately five minutes to complete. To preserve party
confidentiality, the magistrate judge excludes party names and case
numbers from the report.48 Magistrate participation in the Chicago
Project is voluntary, and the settlement memoranda are compiled
monthly into a report for judges' use.
That judges' desires for more helpful and germane information
on settlements motivated the Chicago Project, and the related data-
gathering effort, is both notable and anomalous. Moreover, at the
operational level, that judges gathered these data (for judges) stands
in stark contrast to conventional wisdom that reflexively characterizes
judges as structurally indifferent-if not disinclined-to participate in
data-creation efforts relating to litigation and judicial decision
making.49
Our data set includes information on 871 settlements involving
nine magistrate judges in the Northern District of Illinois spanning six
years (1999-2004, inclusive). The 871 settlements include 396 usable
employment discrimination cases and 106 personal injury cases.50 All
396 employment discrimination case settlements include monetary
45 Somewhat oddly, although Kotkin refers to "[r]egression analysis" in the text, id. at
158, actual regression output, at least in any standard form, is not found in her article.
46 See id. at 127-28.
47 See id. at 128.
48 See Denlow & Shack, supra note 12, at 19, 21.
49 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Steams, Appellate Courts Inside and Out, 101 Micu. L. REv. 1764,
1769 (2003) (noting thatjudges' voluntary participation in ajudicial reform study was "not
surprisingly incomplete").
50 We used the 106 personal injury cases in supplemental analyses.
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terms, and 144 (36.4%) involved nonmonetary terms that objectively
favored either the plaintiff or defendant. The nonmonetary terms
typically involved injunctive relief, such as employee reinstatement or
promotion. Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately
quantify the financial value of nonmonetary awards. Such nonmone-
tary awards can easily influence the financial settlement amount. To
control for the possible influence of the presence of nonmonetary
awards, a dummy variable signals their presence and is included as a
control variable for settlement models. Although our data do not
speak directly to nonmonetary awards, the data do speak to the possi-
ble influence of the stage of litigation, the type of employment dis-
crimination alleged, and the nature of the alleged harm on the
plaintiff demand, defendant offer, and the final settlement amount.
Our data set, while unique, is not without important limitations.
First, it includes information only on employment discrimination
cases filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
that settled incident to settlement conference participation. Employ-
ment discrimination cases that settled independent of participation in
the Chicago Project are not included. Also not included are employ-
ment discrimination cases that participated in the Chicago Project but
did not settle. The inclusion of only settled cases poses consequential
limitations on the analytical weight that our findings can responsibly
support. Thus, our research question of interest dwells on factors that
influence settlement amounts, and our findings safely extend only to
the universe of settled employment discrimination cases.
Second, coding for both the type of employment discrimination
alleged as well as for the nature of the alleged injury permitted more
than one selection, and this result has the consequence of complicat-
ing statistical analyses. Third, confounding assessments about the
value of final settlement amounts is that in many cases, critical infor-
mation involving the plaintiffs lost wages is either missing or was
folded into the final settlement without differentiating between the
compensatory and back-pay components. Although this data limita-
tion does not implicate the accuracy of the final settlement amount, it
reduces our ability to place the settlement into a broader context.
B. Basic Analytic Approach
We examine settlements (S) as a function of the Plaintiff's De-
mand (D) and Defendant's Offer (0), taking into account as appro-
priate other characteristics of individual cases. Most generally, the
offer and demand affects settlement in the following way:
S = 0 + b(D - 0).
In this equation, b is a measure of the plaintiffs bargaining
power, ranging from 0 (no plaintiff bargaining power) to 1 (complete
2011]1 941
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plaintiff bargaining power). When b = 0.5, the parties have equal bar-
gaining power and split the difference. Rearranging the terms,
b = (S - 0) / (D - 0) is the proportion of the difference in initial
positions that the plaintiff gets in settlement.
Converting the terms in the first equation into natural logs, we
get:
In S = In 0 + b'(In D - In 0).
We interpret b' as a measure of how the parties split the order of mag-
nitude of the initial difference.
One hypothesis is that the parties might split the numeric differ-
ence. Thus, if the plaintiff demands $100,000 and the defendant of-
fers $20,000, they will evenly split the $80,000 disagreement, and the
resulting settlement will be $60,000. Others might hypothesize that
defendant-employers have superior bargaining power and will take
the lion's share so that the settlement is closer to the defendant's offer
than the plaintiffs demand.
III
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
The usable data set includes settlements from 396 employment
discrimination cases. Nine separate magistrate judges participated,
and seven of these judges participated in ten or more settled cases.51
The raw number of settlements increased from 1999 to 2004, albeit
unevenly, as the program added cases. This increase comports with
larger national shifts in civil litigation away from trials and toward set-
tlement as the mechanism for resolution.5 2 Data from these settled
cases provide insights into final settlement amounts, comparisons be-
tween what plaintiffs initially demanded and ultimately accepted, as
well as the influence of such key variables as plaintiff demands and
defendant offers.
A. Final Settlement Amounts
Figure 1 presents the distribution of final settlement amounts
(converted into 2004 dollars53 ) and illustrates the distribution's strong
left skew. The settlement values ranged from $350 to $1,250,000 with
a mean of $65,950. The raw summary settlement findings are consis-
51 One of the magistrate judges who contributed fewer than ten cases, W. Thomas
Rosemond, Jr., retired in 2001. See Magistrate Judges of the Northern District of Illinois, N.
Disnucr OF ILL. CT. His-. Ass'N, http://www.ilndhistory.uscourts.gov/Magistrates.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
52 See Yeazell, supra note 39, at 954-64 (explaining some of the dynamics underlying
the shift from trials to settlements).
53 To convert into 2004 dollars, we relied on the Minneapolis Federal Reserve CPI
indices. See THE FED. REs. BANK OF MINNEAPous, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/re-
search/data/us/calc/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
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tent with Kotkin's findings, though she studied a slightly different
time period.54
FIGURE 1:
DISTRIUTIN orF~INAL SErrLMENT AmouNT
0
0
00-
C,
V
00-
$0 $0.5M $1.0M
Final Settlement Amount
$1.5M
Note: Final settlement amounts are in 2004 dollars.
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
As is often the case, untransformed award amounts do not typi-
cally distribute normally. The skewed distribution of the final settle-
ment amounts from our data set (Figure 1) illustrates this. To achieve
the desired distribution for analytic purposes, we use logarithmic
scales to transform the final settlement amounts data.55 Figures 2 and
3 present the kernel density estimates5 6 of the settlement values and
the plaintiff bargaining-power ratio (b), respectively, after
transformation.
54 Although Kotkin reports a mean settlement amount of $54,651, it is unclear from
her study whether she converted "Gross Amounts of Recovery" into real dollars. See
Kotkin, supra note 12, at 144.
55 For a discussion about the need to logarithmically transform awards and of the
need for transformation to satisfy various regression assumptions, see generally Theodore
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compensatory
Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 181-85
(2006).
56 For a discussion of the kernel density estimation, see B.W. SILVERMAN, DENSITY Esn-
MATION FOR STATISTICS AND DATA ANALYSIS 34-75 (1998).
2011] 943
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 2:
KERNAL DENSITY ESTIMATES OF (LOG) FINAL SETTLEMENT
AMOUNTS
6 8 10 12 14
Final Settlement Amount (log)
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
B. Demands, Offers, Final Settlements, and "Discounts"
Critical to negotiation theory and practice is the spread between
the initial plaintiff demand and defendant offer, as well as the spread
between the plaintiff demand and the amount the plaintiff accepted
to settle the dispute. Reasons explaining why plaintiffs settle for an
amount less than what they initially demand vary. Plaintiffs' initial de-
mands may exceed the actual value of their losses. After all, it is typi-
cally far easier to simply assert the value of harm in a complaint than it
is to prove the harm beyond the preponderance of the evidence.
Also, the transactions costs-including legal fees-incident to plain-
tiffs seeking recovery through the legal system can be considerable.57
Thus, the pursuit of a "full" recovery may not make economic sense
after discounting for necessary costs, legal and other. Finally, in their
study comparing verdict amounts and actual payouts in the medical
malpractice area, Professor David Hyman and his colleagues empha-
size the role of defendants' malpractice insurance policy limits on
postverdict settlement amounts.5 8 Presumably, many of the defen-
dant-employers in this study have insured themselves against risks re-
57 See Yeazell, supra note 39, at 951.
58 See Hyman et al., supra note 31, at 53-54.
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FIGuRE 3:
KERNAL DENSITY ESTIMATES OF (LOG) PLAINTIFF
BARGAINING-POWER RATIO
aN
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Plaintiff Bargaining-Power Ratio (log)
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
lating to employment discrimination claims, and these insurance
policies include limits.
To assess the bargaining ratios, we organized the 396 disputes in
our data set into rough quartiles based on the size of plaintiffs' initial
demands. Table 1 presents mean plaintiff demands, defendant offers,
final settlements, and plaintiff bargaining power for each of the four
plaintiff demand quartiles. Results in Table 1 do not give a clean pat-
tern, but they do suggest that plaintiffs' bargaining power decreased
as the litigation stakes increased.
Two reference points-albeit imperfect and limited-provide
some helpful context. First, the inverse linear relation between the
mean settlement-demand ratio (again, a proxy for the plaintiff "dis-
count") and the initial plaintiff demand, illustrated in Table 1, is
structurally analogous to findings from Hyman's study of haircuts in
postverdict settlements in the Texas medical malpractice context.59
In the Hyman study, the authors found that " [t] he larger the adjusted
verdict, the more likely and larger the haircut."6 0 Second, a similar
analysis of settlements involving a different case type-personal injury
59 See id. at 32.
60 Id.
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TABLE 1:
MEAN DEMAND, OFFER, SETTLEMENT, AND PIrIFF BARGAINING-
POWER RATIO BY SIZE OF PLAINTIFF DEMAND
Mean Mean Plaintiff
Plaintiff Mean Plaintiff Defendant Mean Bargaining-Power
Demand Demand Offer Settlement Ratio
($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) (S - O)/(D - 0) n
< 50 28.4 6.0 12.9 0.31 79
50 - 100 74.5 9.6 27.7 0.29 112
101 - 250 158.0 16.0 53.5 0.29 106
> 250 663.2 59.7 173.2 0.21 93
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
cases-reveals similar relations among plaintiff demands, defendant
offers, and final settlements.61
On the surface, the relation of the mean raw plaintiff demands,
defendant offers, and final settlements (Table 1) implies only that the
mean final settlement amounts were substantially closer to defendant
offers than to plaintiff demands. Further analysis, however, reveals a
persistent pattern.62 Specifically, as Table 2 illustrates, in all 396 set-
tlements, the mean log final settlement amount is extraordinarily
close the average of the mean log plaintiff demand and mean log de-
fendant offer. That is, in the world of natural logs, the final settle-
ment splits the difference between the plaintiff demand and
defendant offer. Indeed, not only does this pattern persist across all
four rough quartiles of the employment discrimination settlements,
but the trend emerges in other case types as well. Specifically, the
pattern of "splitting the logs" also describes settlement activity involv-
ing personal injury claims.63
To be sure, we do not suggest that litigants enter settlement nego-
tiations thinking in terms of mathematical logs. Thus, we resist plac-
ing too much analytic weight on this finding. That said, the pattern
does shed light on the structure of settlements and, more generally,
bargaining theory. Within the context of natural logs (Table 2), final
settlements typically "split the difference" between plaintiff demands
and defendant offers. We suggest that the parties intuitively weigh the
order of magnitude of their initial positions and then split the differ-
ence of those magnitudes. As Table 2 shows, plaintiffs and defendants
differ by two or three orders of magnitude in their initial positions.
61 For the results from the analysis of 106 personal injury settlements, also incident to
the Chicago Project, see infra Appendix Tables A2 and A3.
62 We are indebted to our Cornell Law School colleagues Theodore Eisenberg and
Jeffrey Rachlinski who independently recognized and then alerted us to this underlying
pattern.
63 See infra Appendix Table AS.
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TABLE 2:
(LOG) MEAN PLAINTIFF DEMAND, (LOG) MEAN DEFENDANT
OFFER, AND (LOG) MEAN SETTLEMENT
Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff
Demand Demand Demand Demand
Mean: All <$50K $50K - $100K $101K - $250K >$250K
(log) Plaintiff Demand 11.64 10.11 11.20 11.93 13.14
(log) Defendant Offer 9.20 8.18 8.87 9.25 10.29
Average of Plaintff Demand and
Defendant Offer 10.42 9.15 10.04 10.59 11.72
Actual (log) Settlement 10.37 9.10 10.00 10.67 11.56
(log) Plaintiff Bargaining-
Power Ratio 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.45
(n) 396 79 112 106 93
NOTE: (log) Plaintiff Bargaining-Power Ratio = (In S - In 0) / (In D - In 0).
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
The final settlement, splitting the logs, is about 1.0 to 1.5 orders of
magnitude above and below the offer and demand.
When one transitions out of the world of natural logs and into
the world of actual constant dollars, however, the results in Table 1
suggest that defendants have greater influence on the outcome. A
$20,000 change in the defendant's initial offer of, say, $25,000 has a
far greater impact on the order of magnitude of its initial offer com-
pared to the order-of-magnitude impact of a $20,000 change in the
plaintiffs higher demand of, say, $200,000. Thus, defendants possess
greater capacity to influence the final settlement amount through rea-
sonable offers than do plaintiffs through reasonable demands. Such
evidence supports an asymmetric bargaining theory favoring
defendants.
IV
ANALYSES
Consistent with common sense, the descriptive analyses imply re-
lations among factors such as demands, offers, and settlements. In
this Part, we explore whether these implied relations survive in regres-
sion models that simultaneously account for more than one factor.
We turn first to standard OLS regression and then to three-stage least
squares models that better account for the temporal dimension inci-
dent to the typical settlement process.
A. Modeling Employment Discrimination Litigation Settlements
We estimated six OLS regression models and present results in
Table 3. Models 1 and 2 focus on final settlement amounts. Models 3
and 4 explore the settlement-demand ratio. Finally, Models 5 and 6
consider the plaintiff bargaining-power ratio.
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Independent variables (principally in dummy variables) include
the stage of litigation when the parties reached settlement along with
the type of discrimination alleged. Our models account for clustering
at the individual judge level, as we cannot safely presume that multi-
ple decisions by the same judge are independent from one another.6 4
We also include the year of settlement to identify any time trend. Fi-
nally, for the final settlement model (Model 1), we include our key
independent variables of interest-the plaintiff's initial demand (or
offer) and the defendant's initial offer (after adjusting to reflect con-
stant 2004 dollars and logging both variables).
1. Final Settlement Amounts
Three variables dominate final settlement amounts: plaintiff de-
mand, defendant offer, and establishing a trial date. As results from
our full final settlement model (Model 1) in Table 3 show, both the
plaintiff demand and defendant offer correlate strongly in the hypoth-
esized direction with the final settlement amount. That is, higher
plaintiff demands and defendant offers correspond with higher final
settlement amounts. Indeed (and as a comparison with Model 2 im-
plies), the absolute and relative strength of the plaintiff demand and
defendant offer on final settlement likely crowded out the potential
influences of other independent variables.
Setting a trial date is the only litigation-stage variable that exerted
an important influence on final settlement amounts with some level of
consistency.65 Although the amount of legal work expended in any
case prior to an actual trial can vary across cases, it is safe to assume
that legal costs escalate for a trial. Setting the trial date is among the
final stages prior to the trial itself. To the extent that the contesting
parties are at all inclined to settle, and if the contesting parties' "bot-
tom lines" for an acceptable final settlement amount are partly a func-
tion of sunk litigation costs, the positive coefficient sign for the
"setting trial date" coefficient makes intuitive sense.
Finally, two particular discrimination claims influenced final set-
tlement amounts, though they did so in opposite directions. Claims
that defendants violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA) ,66 as well as discrimination claims based in race, achieved sta-
tistical significance in Model 1 (but not in Model 2). Interestingly,
64 Results from unpublished alternative specifications reveal that our results are ro-
bust whether we include judge dummy variables, cluster at the judge level, or both. We
also tested our results with fixed, as well as random, effects models.
65 By consistency, we mean that no other variable achieved statistical significance in
more than one of our four models.
66 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
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FMLA claims correspond with increased settlement amounts where
race-based claims correspond with lower settlement amounts.
To indirectly assess the power of the plaintiff demand and defen-
dant offer on the final settlement amount, in Model 2, we reran the
model excluding those two key variables. Comparing how the results
in Models 1 and 2 vary illustrates the influence of the plaintiff demand
and defendant offer in the final settlement model. Perhaps the key
difference in Models 1 and 2 involves their explanatory power. The R-
squared in Model 1 (with the plaintiff demand and defendant offer
variables) is 0.822, meaning that the variables explain 82.2% of the
variance in final settlement amounts. In Model 2, after removing the
demand and offer variables, the R-squared falls dramatically to only
0.210. Removing the plaintiff demand and defendant offer variables
also makes room for the emergence of other independent variables.
In Model 2, other litigation stages (e.g., prediscovery, setting trial
date, completing discovery, and the denial of dispositive motions)
achieved statistical significance, joining retaliation, which also
achieved statistical significance.
2. Settlement-Demand & Plaintiff Bargaining-Power Ratios
In addition to the final settlement amount, another important
settlement outcome is the spread between what the plaintiff initially
demanded and the actual settled amount. As previously discussed, the
settlement-demand ratio is the ratio of the final financial settlement
agreed to by the parties to the original plaintiff demand. The settle-
ment-demand ratio is helpful in that it illustrates the "spread" between
what a plaintiff initially demanded and the settlement amount the
plaintiff subsequently accepted. That actual ratios almost always fell
below 1.0 indicates that plaintiffs typically settled for a value less than
they originally demanded.
Results from the two settlement-demand ratio model specifica-
tions (Models 3 and 4) generally comport with results from our final
settlement amounts models (Models 1 and 2). The key finding that
links the final settlement amount and the settlement-demand ratio
models involves the defendant offer's influence. Also similar is that in
the full settlement-demand ratio model (Model 3) only one other vari-
able (age discrimination claims) achieved statistical significance. Fi-
nally, the full model (Model 3) explains more (though only slightly
more) variation than the partial model (Model 4).
Although results from the full final settlement and the settle-
ment-demand ratio models (Models 1 and 3) are generally consistent,
they also differ in important ways. In the full settlement model
(Model 1), the plaintiff demand and defendant offer strongly corre-
late with the final settlement amount. In the full settlement-demand
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model (Model 3), however, only the defendant offer emerged as sig-
nificant. This finding implies that, as between the plaintiff and defen-
dant activity, the defendant's activity exerted more influence.
Further, rather than reflect the influence of plaintiffs or defendants,
in terms of litigation stage, the full plaintiff bargaining-power ratio
model (Model 5) illustrates the persistent influence of setting a trial
date.
Taken as a whole, and important differences notwithstanding,
findings from our OLS regression models, presented in Table 3, sug-
gest that when it comes to final settlement values (and, to a lesser
extent, settlement-demand ratios), the plaintiff demand and the de-
fendant offer mattered most. Also important, though with less robust-
ness, was setting a trial date. No other litigation stage or form of
employment discrimination correlates with our dependent variables
of interest, particularly final settlement amount, with any consistent
strength. As it relates to final settlement amount, Table 3 suggests
that plaintiff demand and defendant offer warrant particular atten-
tion, particularly as to how they might interact.
B. Multistage Models
A methodological shift from standard OLS regression to multi-
stage models uncovers an important wrinkle in how the plaintiff de-
mand and defendant offer interact and inform final settlement
amounts. To the extent that litigation proceeds in discrete stages, it-
erative, multistage modeling is a helpful way to gain a more textured
understanding of the variables and their interactions. To this end,
our three-stage least squares model assesses the plaintiffs initial de-
mand, the defendant's offer to that demand, and the final settlement
amount that the plaintiff and defendant agreed to. To be sure, even
multistage models impose simplicity on an activity (settlement negoti-
ations) that can be anything but simple. After all, rather than follow-
ing a set, three-step process, we remain confident that negotiations
that culminate in settlements frequently involve many complex and
potentially dynamic interactions between the plaintiff and defendant
(and likely other parties). Limitations with three-stage modeling not-
withstanding, we feel that the multistage model's incorporation of a
structured temporal dimension into settlement activity more closely
approximates actual settlement activity than simple OLS regression
models.
In our three-stage regression model, the first equation estimates
the plaintiffs demand as a function of various case characteristics. In
other words, the plaintiff is the first mover, making a demand. The
second equation estimates the defendant's responding offer as a func-
tion of various case characteristics and the plaintiffs estimated de-
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TABLE 3:
OLS FINAL SETTLEMENT AND SETTLEMENT RATIO MODELS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Plaintiff Plaintiff
Settlement- Settlement- Bargaining- Bargaining-
Final Final Demand Demand Power Power
Settlement Settlement Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
Plaintiff Demand
Defendant Offer
Litigation Stage
Early
Prior to Any Discovery
Discovery Cut-Off Date
Set
Discovery in Progress
Discovery Complete
Dispositive Motion
Pending
Dispositive Motion
Denied
Dispositive Motion
Partly Denied or Partly
Granted
Final Pretrial Order
Date Set
Final Pretrial Order
Filed
Trial Date Set
Discrimination Form-
Age
Disability
FMIA
National origin
Pregnancy
Race
Religion
Retaliation
Sex
Sexual Harassment
Nonmonetary Terms
Year Settled
Constant
R-Squared
(N)
0.423** - -0.049 - -0.014 -
(0.042) (0.021) (0.012)
0.529** - 0.076** - 0.001 -
(0.036) (0.013) (0.001)
0.051 -0.289 0.030 0.028 0.009 0.012
(0.111) (0.216) (0.114) (0.112) (0.042) (0.042)
-0.099 -0.645* -0.014 -0.039 -0.033 -0.027
(0.140) (0.229) (0.074) (0.084) (0.064) (0.067)
0.019 -0.275 0.104 0.113 0.016 0.018
(0.072) (0.164) (0.083) (0.075) (0.036) (0.036)
0.078 0.041 0.063 0.057 0.003 0.001
(0.086) (0.255) (0.057) (0.063) (0.041) (0.036)
0.020 -0.292* -0.049 -0.052 -0.024 -0.023
(0.090) (0.096) (0.063) (0.056) (0.029) (0.028)
-0.115 -0.404 0.140 0.072 -0.043 -0.044
(0.168) (0.328) (0.155) (0.136) (0.046) (0.046)
0.024 0.403* -0.060 -0.067 0.015 0.008
(0.086) (0.162) (0.049) (0.038) (0.043) (0.040)
-0.282 -0.008 -0.031 -0.078 -0.082 -0.088
(0.146) (0.417) (0.061) (0.041) (0.091) (0.083)
0.058 0.069 -0.032 -0.059 -0.029 -0.034
(0.133) (0.502) (0.036) (0.053) (0.047) (0.043)
-0.118 0.303 0.121 0.129 -0.094 -0.100
(0.145) (0.291) (0.249) (0.258) (0.061) (0.056)
0.198* 0.681* 0.075 0.096* 0.095* 0.089*
(0.060) (0.243) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
-0.063 0.293 -0.140* -0.123 -0.024 -0.027
(0.055) (0.130) (0.050) (0.052) (0.026) (0.025)
-0.108 0.357 -0.120 -0.098 -0.026 -0.033
(0.081) (0.191) (0.055) (0.068) (0.040) (0.037)
0.325* 0.362 0.017 0.023 0.086* 0.084*
(0.106) (0.270) (0.057) (0.085) (0.030) (0.029)
-0.294 -0.017 -0.213 -0.214 -0.106* -0.113*
(0.164) (0.307) (0.117) (0.107) (0.038) (0.042)
-0.098 0.154 0.066 0.054 -0.044 -0.047
(0.131) (0.154) (0.085) (0.094) (0.051) (0.051)
-0.166* -0.187 -0.001 -0.034 -0.053* -0.054*
(0.060) (0.113) (0.046) (0.048) (0.019) (0.018)
-0.077 0.058 -0.053 -0.037 -0.001 -0.013
(0.141) (0.280) (0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.070)
0.050 0.362* 0.003 0.023 -0.002 -0.006
(0.076) (0.116) (0.092) (0.081) (0.042) (0.043)
-0.081 0.179 0.013 0.054 -0.042 -0.046
(0.106) (0.237) (0.062) (0.056) (0.030) (0.028)
0.021 0.252 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.015
(0.063) (0.234) (0.081) (0.076) (0.032) (0.031)
-0.024 0.162 -0.044 -0.028 -0.006 -0.008
(0.080) (0.107) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043)
-0.034 -0.041 -0.014 -0.024* -0.006 -0.007
(0.015) (0.035) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
69.340 92.242 28.969 49.198* 13.101 13.697
(30.682) (70.032) (20.296) (16.554) (10.868) (11.599)
0.822 0.210 0.243 0.212 0.076 0.072
376 396 246 256 376 376
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SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
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mand. In other words, the defendant makes an offer after
considering the plaintiffs demand and the characteristics of the case.
The final equation estimates the final settlement based on case char-
acteristics and both the plaintiffs demand and the defendant's offer.
As Table 4 makes clear, in the second stage of the three-stage
model, the plaintiff demand exerted the strongest influence on the
defendant offer.67 Table 4 also illustrates that in the third stage of our
model-focusing on the final settlement amount-the defendant's of-
fer strongly influenced the final amount, and the influence of the
plaintiff's demand waned. These results suggest that the plaintiffs de-
mand plays a role in the final settlement value but does so indirectly.
Specifically, plaintiff demand informs the defendant's offer, and the
defendant's offer in turn significantly influences the final settlement
value.
Results from the three-stage least squares model (Table 4) com-
port with intuition and underscore the importance of careful model-
ing. Conventional wisdom-along with our results in Table 3-
illustrates the importance of plaintiff demands and defendant offers
on final settlement amounts. By design, however, the standard OLS
models assume a static picture of the relation among plaintiff de-
mands, defendant offers, and final settlement amounts. The standard
OLS regression model is insensitive to any timing that might influence
the relation among demands, offers, and final settlements.
The three-stage least squares model, unlike standard OLS regres-
sion models, better reflects the temporal and dynamic relations be-
tween the key independent variables-plaintiff demands and
defendant offers-and how they influence final settlement amounts.
Results in Table 4 supply critical nuance, texture, and context to the
results in Table 3. Specifically, while both the key independent vari-
ables of interest remain statistically significant, of equal importance is
the structure of their significance and how that structure informs final
settlement amounts. While results from the standard OLS regression
models (Table 3) imply that the plaintiff demand influences the final
settlement offer directly, results from our multistage model imply a
more structured and indirect set of relations. To be sure, we do not
minimize the importance of plaintiff demands on final settlement
amounts. Rather, our point is that results in Table 4 suggest that the
influence of the plaintiffs demand on the final settlement is indirect
and better understood as expressing itself through the defendant's
offer.
67 Only one other variable-setting the final pretrial order date-achieved
significance.
[Vol. 96:931952
SPLITTING LOGS
TABLE 4:
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARE PLAINTIFF DEMAND, DEFENDANT
OFFER FINAL, AND SETTLEMENT MODELS
(1) (2) (3)
Plaintiff Defendant Final
Demand Offer Settlement
Plaintiff Demand - 0.879** -0.165
(0.143)
Defendant Offer
Litigation Stage
Early
Prior to Any Discovery
Discovery Cut-Off Date Set
Discovery in Progress
Discovery Complete
Dispositive Motion Pending
Dispositive Motion Denied
Dispositive Motion Partly Denied or Partly
Granted
Final Pretrial Order Date Set
Final Pretrial Order Filed
Trial Date Set
Nonmonetary Terms
Constant
(N)
-0.362*
(0.174)
-0.534
(0.272)
-0.157
(0.160)
0.231
(0.186)
-0.119
(0.168)
0.140
(0.302)
0.451*
(0.218)
0.353
(0.451)
0.223
(0.216)
0.256
(0.363)
0.507**
(0.195)
11.671**
(0.151)
376
-0.190
(0.169)
-0.062
(0.261)
0.009
(0.149)
-0.170
(0.174)
-0.142
(0.155)
-0.478
(0.279)
0.010
(0.211)
-0.249
(0.418)
-0.432*
(0.201)
-0.114
(0.336)
0.330
(0.193)
-0.944
(1.679)
376
(0.127)
0.983**
(0.104)
0.075
(0.106)
-0.175
(0.158)
-0.007
(0.090)
0.192
(0.112)
0.054
(0.094)
0.120
(0.173)
0.145
(0.133)
0.029
(0.255)
0.294*
(0.127)
0.006
(0.203)
0.154
(0.125)
-0.061
(0.064)
3.212**
(1.123)
376
NOTES: All three models include dummy variables for each of the nine judges. Plaintiffs may
have asserted more than one discrimination form. Final settlement, plaintiff offer, and
defendant demand values were logged and converted into 2004 dollars. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
CONCLUSION
Those seeking to understand employment discrimination litiga-
tion in federal courts without assessing settlements do so at some
peril. Studying employment discrimination litigation by focusing on
the comparatively rare case that results in a court decision is analo-
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gous to studying icebergs from the deck of a passing ship. To be sure,
the tips of icebergs are important and should not be ignored. At the
same time, the bulk of the iceberg is found below the water line and
largely obscured from vision. The same holds for employment dis-
crimination litigation: the bulk of the action takes place in settings
other than courtrooms and judicial decrees. A more complete under-
standing of employment discrimination litigation requires observers
to account for the key activities that take place prior to any court
decision.
A systematic accounting of employment discrimination settle-
ment activity requires data. Regrettably, such data remain rare. The
data that the Chicago Project generated, while far from perfect, none-
theless help fill a critical void. Results from our study of that settle-
ment data underscore the salience of plaintiff demands and
defendant offers on settlement outcomes. Our results also call into
question some aspects of conventional wisdom that emphasize the in-
dependent influence of the stage of litigation or the type of discrimi-
nation claim advanced. While various litigation stages achieved
significance in various models, the influence of the plaintiff demand
and defendant offer consistently exerted greater influence. Should
helpful data emerge, future research might consider comparing the
subpool of employment cases that settle with those that do not. Such
an inquiry will more squarely assess the efficacy of settlement confer-
ence policies, such as those in place in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois and elsewhere.
Another point is methodological. By comparing results from
standard OLS regression models with results from three-stage least
squares models, we find important clues about how key variables re-
late and interact. Specifically, we found that the plaintiff demand's
influence was expressed through (and likely helped frame) the defen-
dant's offer. And it was the defendant's offer that correlated with the
final settlement amount. Although initial plaintiff demand was impor-
tant, its influence on the final settlement amount was indirect as com-
pared with the more direct influence of the defendant offer.
Finally, we note that final settlements display the interesting char-
acteristic of "splitting logs," whereby the parties generally split the log-
arithm or the order of magnitude of the initial positions. We do not
imply that the "splitting the logs" finding possesses anything but a de-
scriptive component. That is, we do not think our findings generate
strategic value for litigating parties. Instead, our more modest aim is
descriptive and, for now, best understood as hopefully prompting fur-
ther study.
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APPENDIX TABLE Al:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES
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Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. n
Final Settlement Amount (2004 dollars) 65,950 110,783 350 1.25M 396
Settlement/Demand Ratio 0.307 0.389 0.008 3.737 256
Plaintiff Bargaining Power Ratio 0.274 0.232 -1.130 2.213 396
Plaintiff Demand (2004 dollars) 226,535 411,736 2,100 4.OM 396
Defendant Offer (2004 dollars) 22,447 49,259 0.0 600,000 396
Discrimination Fomn:
Age
Disability
FMLA
National origin
Pregnancy
Race
Religion
Retaliation
Sex
Sexual Harassment
Nonmonetary Terms
Litigation Stage.
Early
Prior to Any Discovery
Discovery Cut-Off Date Set
Discovery in Progress
Discovery Complete
Dispositive Motion Pending
Dispositive Motion Denied
Dispositive Motion Partly Denied or
Partly Granted
Final Pretrial Order Date Set
Final Pretrial Order Filed
Trial Date Set
0.177 0.382
0.189 0.392
0.038 0.191
0.025 0.157
0.045 0.209
0.336 0.473
0.025 0.157
0.164 0.371
0.167 0.373
0.159 0.366
.0364 0.482
0.222 0.416
0.051 0.219
0.268 0.443
0.141 0.349
0.263 0.441
0.040 0.197
0.076 0.265
0.015 0.122
0.098 0.298
0.028 0.165
0.157 0.364
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
1.0 396
Source: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
APPENDIX TABLE A2:
MEAN DEMAND, OFFER, SETTLEMENT, AND SETTLEMENT/DEMAND
RATIO BY SIZE OF PLAINTIFF DEMAND-PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Plaintiff Mean Plaintiff Mean Mean
Demand Demand Defendant Settlement Mean Demand/
($000) ($000) Offer ($000) ($000) Settlement Ratio n
<180 95.0 21.2 46.9 0.530 25
180 - 330 260.7 53.2 111.4 0.441 27
331 - 800 522.5 114.4 232.2 0.456 23
>800 2,196.5 292.3 793.4 0.369 31
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
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APPENDIX TABLE A3:
(LOG) MEAN PLAINTIFF DEMAND, (LOG) MEAN DEFENDANT
OFFER, AND (LOG) MEAN SETTLEMENT-PERSONAL
INJURY CASES
Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff
Demand Demand Demand Demand
Mean: All <$180K $180K - $330K $331K - $800K >$800K
(log) Plaintiff Demand 12.86 11.20 12.45 13.14 14.34
(log) Defendant Offer 10.97 9.68 10.61 11.35 12.13
Average of Plaintiff Demand
and Defendant Offer 11.92 10.44 11.53 12.25 13.24
Actual (log) Settlement 11.92 10.48 11.52 12.23 13.20
(n) 106 25 27 23 31
SOURCE: Chicago Judicial Settlement Project Data Set, 1999-2004.
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